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INTRODUCTION 
Rather than relying solely on the formal interpretations of govern-
ment regulators invited by the structure of local zoning ordinances, the 
City of Seattle should adopt a process that invites community-based me-
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diation and problem-solving when a significant shift in housing density is 
contemplated in a developer’s proposal. Greater resident participation in 
development projects allows the City of Seattle to better support those 
residents in their reliance interests arising from zoning ordinances while 
simultaneously furthering the policies that underpin urban zoning. This is 
especially true when such development projects raise the possibility of 
substantial impacts on the character of a community or its commons. 
Moreover, such alternative dispute resolution processes may also help to 
mitigate potential detriments to the community commons or provide a 
mechanism for an equitable exchange of capital between developers and 
residents to offset negative impacts to property values. 
This Note specifically examines the development of urban residen-
tial property into micro-housing apartment buildings in the City of Seat-
tle, the possible consequences, and a potential community-based solution 
for disputes regarding such development. Part I introduces the issue us-
ing anecdotal and quantitative information, including snapshots of some 
of the conflicts between urban homeowners and developers and the 
sometimes questionable application of local zoning ordinances to favor 
development in the context of micro-housing in Seattle. Included in this 
discussion is a summary of the “smart growth” principles that supported 
the development and the countervailing interests of incumbent residents. 
Part II examines Washington State’s Growth Management Act and sug-
gests how it may have impacted the quick acceptance of micro-housing 
development in Seattle. Part III explores incumbent residents’ reliance 
interests in zoning ordinances for protection against externalities and 
maintenance of consumer surplus in their homes. Part IV reviews the 
potential harms suffered by residents adjacent to dramatic residential de-
velopment and the legal remedies available at law. Finally, I offer a 
community-based solution to allow for the redress of such harms. 
I. THE BACKSTORY 
With housing prices soaring in attractive urban neighborhoods and 
demand for cost-conscious rental options increasing, developers in a va-
riety of jurisdictions have shown interest in micro-housing development. 
Cities including New York, Boston, San Francisco, and Seattle have ei-
ther allowed or actively promoted micro-unit housing development with-
in their borders.1 Supporters champion micro-units as a way of providing 
affordable housing, reducing sprawling development through urban in-
fill, mitigating the energy usage and environmental impact of larger de-
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velopments, and allowing seniors to age in place.2 City planners, busi-
ness leaders, and local officials have embraced micro-units as a means 
through which expensive cities can attract and retain young profession-
als.3 However, given the burgeoning attempts to permit and encourage 
these housing types on a larger scale, no comprehensive analyses of their 
actual effects have been completed. 
A. The Loophole: An Early Path to Micro-Housing                               
Development in Seattle 
Seattle has seen the most significant development of micro-housing 
units, and many of those developments have sparked controversy in the 
city.4 As of July 2014, Seattle had permitted over 3,600 micro-housing 
units, with many residences already occupied and several projects un-
derway in varied stages of development.5 Until 2013, shrewd developers 
exploited what many long-term neighborhood residents described as a 
“loophole” in city regulations.6 Housing in Seattle with nine or more in-
dividuals in a unit was traditionally classified as “congregate housing” 
and was subject to a public review process.7 To stay under this number, 
developers built buildings with “suites” containing eight separately-
leased apartments for single individuals; the apartments had a private 
bathroom and kitchenette but shared one full kitchen.8 Because each 
“suite” was considered one “unit,” developers were able to avoid design 
and environmental reviews by building seven or fewer “suites” in each 
building on their property.9 In Seattle’s low-rise districts, where many of 
these buildings have been developed, mandatory review was triggered 
only if more than eight dwelling units were developed.10 
                                                     
 2. Dominic Holden, Thinking Small: A Loophole for Really Affordable Housing, THE 
STRANGER (June 4, 2009), https://www.thestranger.com/seattle/thinking-small/Content?oid= 
1635067. 
 3. Thompson, supra note 1. 
 4. See Maria Dolan, Are Apodments Ruining Seattle Neighborhoods?, SEATTLE MAG., 
Nov. 2012, at 106–11, available at http://www.seattlemag.com/article/are-apodments-ruining-
seattle-neighborhoods (discussing the controversy surrounding developments of Seattle “aPod-
ments”). 
 5. Dominic Holden, The Fight Against Small Apartments, THE STRANGER (May 8, 2013), 
https://www.thestranger.com/seattle/the-fight-against-small-apartments/Content?oid=16701155. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Holden, supra note 2 (discussing code regulations governing congregate housing). 
 8. Lynn Thompson, Critics of Micro-Apartments Calling for a Moratorium, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Apr. 25, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/critics-of-micro-apartments-
calling-for-a-moratorium. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See CITY OF SEATTLE DEP’T OF CONSTR. & INSPECTIONS, TIP 238, DESIGN REVIEW: 
GENERAL INFORMATION, APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS, AND SUBMITTAL REQUIREMENTS 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.seattle.gov/DPD/Publications/CAM/cam238.pdf; CITY OF SEATTLE DEP’T 
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As such, developers were able to build apartment complexes with, 
ostensibly, up to fifty-six rentable units without submitting to any of the 
normal public comment processes or environmental impact reviews that 
the building of a traditional nine-unit apartment building in that same 
neighborhood would trigger. At the same time, developers counted the 
units differently for different purposes: they used each separate sleeping 
area as a unit when applying for tax exemptions, but combined seven of 
these spaces together when applying for building permits.11 Though Seat-
tle’s Office of Housing announced in March 2013 that it would no longer 
allow developers to use different unit counts to serve different purposes, 
many projects were approved before this change and thus were able to 
take advantage of this previously uncontemplated loophole.12 
B. The Neighbors Complained and Development Increased 
As early as 2009, neighbors of these micro-unit development pro-
jects lodged complaints with Seattle including: the insufficiency of 
on-street parking in the area for the increased utilization from dozens of 
new neighbors, overcrowding of the residential neighborhood, and ad-
verse changes to the neighborhood’s character and aesthetics.13 Some 
also stated concerns for micro-housing residents, such as the lack of 
proper egress from top floors to ensure safety during a fire.14 Even 
though some have championed these micro-housing developments as a 
form of “smart growth,” many long-time residents argued that they con-
stituted an “upzon[ing] without any process” and failed a long-term 
planning goal of adequately spreading increased density citywide.15 
Many neighbors of such projects asked the city to enact a moratorium on 
micro-housing development until some of their concerns could be better 
addressed by a modernized building code.16 Yet, officials at the Seattle 
Department of Construction and Inspections (SDCI) permitted a signifi-
cant number of micro-housing developments throughout 2009, and over 
the next several years SDCI (formerly known as the Department of Plan-
ning and Development) created training protocols for its planners to rec-
ognize and permit micro-housing under townhouse and congregate hous-
                                                                                                                       
OF CONSTR. & INSPECTIONS, TIP 208, WHEN ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW IS REQUIRED IN SEATTLE 1 
(2012), available at http://www.seattle.gov/DPD/Publications/CAM/cam208.pdf. 
 11. Thompson, supra note 8. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.   
 14. Id. 
 15. Dolan, supra note 4. 
 16. Id. 
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ing definitions.17 Subsequent to this change, there was a rapid increase in 
congregate projects. Approximately 1,100 units were permitted using the 
congregate designation, with a number of projects housing well over 100 
people;18 the largest was slated to contain 235 people in individual 
units.19 
One early development in the Capitol Hill neighborhood, built un-
der the aPodments brand, described its project as “town houses” under 
the land use code but as a “boarding house” under the building code.20 
This sleight-of-hand maneuver allowed the developer to construct the 
buildings without participating in any design review procedures or 
providing the type of notice to its neighbors that would otherwise have 
been required for the construction of a multifamily housing development 
of its size in that neighborhood.21 Many of these apartments were only 
approximately 150 square feet in size and, like many such micro-housing 
units, lacked sinks in the bathrooms to avoid being labeled “dwelling 
units.”22 In addition, tiny in-unit kitchenettes were overlooked by plan-
ners at SDCI using an “unwritten interpretation” suggesting that the 
building code’s “cooking appliance” specification for kitchens required 
the presence of a full stove in order to qualify as a true “dwelling unit.”23 
C. Residents’ Countervailing Interests 
Some community residents argue that such infill projects result in 
adverse effects on surrounding neighborhoods. These costs may include 
such negative externalities as increased traffic congestion or lost open 
space associated with infill.24 Many of these local concerns relate to a 
fear that an increase in population translates to a greater demand for local 
services that will be either paid for directly through increased taxes or 
indirectly by decreased service quality due to overcrowding.25 This con-
cern is most salient for development that occurs at significantly higher 
densities in neighborhoods that have historically housed only single fam-
                                                     
 17. Micro-Housing Provokes Big Debate, SEATTLE NEIGHBORHOOD COAL. (July 1, 2014), 
http://seattleneighborhoodcoalition.wordpress.com/micro-housing-provokes-big-debate/. 
 18. Sara Solovitch, Scrunched in Seattle, POLITICO MAG. (Oct. 14, 2014), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/seattle-micro-housing-boom-111874. 
 19. Id. 
 20. SEATTLE NEIGHBORHOOD COAL., supra note 17. 
 21. See Thompson, supra note 8. 
 22. Holden, supra note 5. 
 23. Solovitch, supra note 18. 
 24. Stephen Malpezzi, Housing Prices, Externalities, and Regulation in U.S. Metropolitan 
Areas, 7 J. HOUSING RES., 209, 210–11 (1996). 
 25. Id. 
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ily homes.26 Moreover, some property buyers associate increased density 
with inner city blight, poor service quality, and other problems.27 Trou-
bling to incumbent residents, these perceived negative externalities could 
result in lower housing prices in the area.28 
D. Other Cities Moved with Caution 
While other municipalities also faced issues with micro-housing 
since around 2009, many responded in a significantly different way than 
Seattle. For example, San Francisco crafted responsive legislation to al-
low 220-square-foot apartments in a 375-unit trial rather than exploiting 
loopholes in the current code to allow the construction of such projects.29 
New York City held a design competition and allowed 250-square-foot 
apartments as the minimum unit size.30 Rather than allowing for unfet-
tered development of this new housing style, these cities took a more 
conservative approach to better determine what design requirements 
should be mandatory for minimum-space dwelling units and engaged in 
controlled experimentation with this type of apartment building. 
E. The Role of “Smart Growth” 
“Smart growth” advocates have applauded Seattle’s quick ac-
ceptance of small-footprint living arrangements such as micro-housing.31 
These advocates seek to change current patterns of low-density dispersed 
development.32 They stress the need for planned growth that concentrates 
development in and near current communities because such projects take 
advantage of existing infrastructure and increase investment in current 
neighborhoods.33 Smart growth advocates also emphasize that planned 
growth reduces the conversion of open space areas with public benefits, 
decreases traffic volumes, and prevents other such external costs associ-
                                                     
 26. Anthony Flint, The Density Dilemma: Appeal and Obstacles for Compact and Transit- 
Oriented Development (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy Working Paper, 2005), available at 
https://drcog.org/documents/Density_dilemma.pdf. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Nathan Hurst, Take That, Tokyo! San Francisco Approves 220-Square-Foot ‘Micro-
Apartments,’ WIRED (Nov. 20, 2012, 5:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/11/san-francisco-
micro-apartments/all/. 
 30. Lidija Grozdanic, Bloomberg Announces Winner of the adAPT NYC Competition to Devel-
op Micro-Unit Dwellings, INHABITAT (Jan. 31, 2013), http://inhabitat.com/nyc/bloomberg-
announces-winners-of-the-adapt-nyc-competition-to-develop-micro-unit-dwellings/. 
 31. Dolan, supra note 4. 
 32. See Anthony Downs, What Does Smart Growth Really Mean?, 67 PLANNING 20, 20–25 
(2001). 
 33. See Anthony Downs, Smart Growth: Why We Discuss It More Than We Do It, 71 J. AM. 
PLAN. ASS’N 367, 367–78 (2005). 
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ated with sprawl.34 The smart growth philosophy holds that low-density 
subdivisions scattered at the exurban fringe exacerbate traffic congestion 
because of longer commutes and increase land consumption due to more 
people living on large individual lots in previously undeveloped areas.35 
The argument is that only better-planned, higher-density developments 
located in and around existing communities can effectively address these 
problems.36 Many of these perceived benefits, like decreased congestion 
and air pollution, are regional in impact.37 
The City of Seattle has also been spurred on in its development 
considerations by Washington State’s Growth Management Act, which 
looks to increase urban infill as a protective measure against sprawling 
development and the diminishment of farm and conservation lands. 
II. WASHINGTON’S GROWTH MANAGEMENT ACT 
From a statutory perspective, the Growth Management Act (GMA) 
controls much of the land use regulation in Washington State.38 The 
GMA “requires state and local governments to manage Washington’s 
growth by identifying and protecting critical areas and natural resource 
lands, designating urban growth areas, preparing comprehensive plans 
and implementing them through capital investments and development 
regulations.”39 The GMA provides thirteen goals to guide cities and 
counties in this course of action, which include the consideration of 
transportation, housing, economic development, natural resource indus-
tries, property rights, and the environment.40 
While the GMA establishes state goals, sets deadlines for compli-
ance, and offers direction for municipalities to prepare comprehensive 
plans and regulations, it relies primarily on local control instead of any 
sort of centralized planning at the state level.41 Within the framework 
provided by the mandates of the GMA, local governments have many 
                                                     
 34. Robert W. Burchell, David Listokin & Catherine C. Galley, Smart Growth: More Than a 
Ghost of Urban Policy Past, Less Than a Bold New Horizon, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 821, 829 
(2000). 
 35. See Mary H. Cooper, Can Managed Growth Reduce Sprawl?, 14 CONG. Q. RESEARCHER 
469 (2004). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 36.70A (1990). The GMA has been recognized as “one of the most 
comprehensive and modern planning statutes in the country” by the American Planning Association. 
AM. PLANNING ASS’N, PLANNING FOR SMART GROWTH: 2002 STATE OF THE STATES 130 (2002). 
 39. Growth Management Laws and Rules, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
http://www.commerce.wa.gov/Services/localgovernment/GrowthManagement/Pages/LawsRules.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
 40. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020 (2002). 
 41. Growth Management Laws, supra note 39. 
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choices regarding the specific content of comprehensive plans and im-
plementing development regulations. The Washington State Department 
of Community, Trade and Economic Development (CTED) does not 
have the authority to certify, approve, or reject plans. The only signifi-
cant check on the land use regulations of local municipalities comes by 
way of the Growth Management Hearings Board, which hears and de-
termines allegations that a government agency has not complied with the 
GMA.42 
The State of Washington originally wrote its GMA in 1990 with the 
goal of allowing communities to participate in the land use planning pro-
cess and tailor the process to their unique needs.43 In practice, however, 
the planning process has continued to be top-down.44 Rural communities 
with declining populations have tended to adopt the same growth man-
agement strategies as cities, such as Seattle, that are experiencing rapid 
growth.45 Moreover, “[r]esidents also have complained that the [local 
growth management] boards largely have ignored some of the GMA’s 
goals, such as recognizing the need to support ‘natural resource indus-
tries’ like farming,” while favoring environmental concerns.46 As such, 
even though the GMA was originally intended to help facilitate commu-
nity participation in land use decisions, it has ostensibly created a policy 
(and potentially bureaucratic) hurdle for neighbors of proposed urban 
infill projects, such as micro-housing development.47 
While the GMA has exerted pressure on the green-lighting of mi-
cro-housing development by Seattle regulators, better local zoning prac-
tices could have pushed back against the top-down mandates to better 
mitigate conflicts between incumbent residents and developers at the 
municipal and neighborhood levels. 
III. ZONING 
In the most ideal sense, zoning provides a deliberative process 
through which residents of a municipality can express their preferences 
                                                     
 42. The board’s administrative rules of practice and procedure can be found in the Washington 
Administrative Code. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE tit. 242-03 (2011). 
 43. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.010 (1990) (“It is in the public interest that citizens, 
communities, local governments, and the private sector cooperate and coordinate with one another in 
comprehensive land use planning.”); id. § 36.70A.020(11) (expressing an intention to “[e]ncourage 
the involvement of citizens in the planning process”). 
 44. Hannah Jacobs, Note, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006 Takings Initia-
tives, 116 YALE L.J. 1518, 1559 (2007). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See MIKE PODOWSKI & GEOFFREY WENTLANDT, SEATTLE DEP’T OF PLANNING & DEV., 
MICRO-HOUSING UNITS AND CONGREGATE RESIDENCES (2014), available at 
http://www.seattle.gov/dpd/cs/groups/pan/@pan/documents/web_informational/s048065.pdf. 
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about the growth and character of their community.48 The prevalence of 
zoning laws suggests that residents may have both financial and nonfi-
nancial interests in the planning and coordination of their communities.49 
Zoning regulations can be seen to preserve “collective values” and to 
protect “a neighborhood from encroachments by land uses inconsistent 
with its character.”50 Courts have also given credence to the view of land 
use planning as a deliberative tool to preserve the overall character of a 
neighborhood.51 For example, courts have upheld procedural measures 
that give all community members “a voice in decisions that will affect 
the future development of their own community”52 as well as govern-
ment actions that “preserve the . . . nature of a community and . . . main-
tain its aesthetic and functional characteristics through zoning require-
ments.”53 
In Washington State, municipal zoning powers trace their origin to 
the state constitution. Under the police power provisions of the Washing-
ton State Constitution, “[a]ny county, city, town or township may make 
and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other 
regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.”54 Yet, Washington 
courts have generally followed “Dillon’s Rule” limiting the authority of 
municipal corporations to that granted by the legislature: “[A] municipal 
corporation’s powers are limited to those conferred in express terms or 
those necessarily implied. If there is any doubt about a claimed grant of 
power it must be denied. The test for necessary or implied municipal 
powers is legal necessity rather than practical necessity.”55 
While preserving the nature of a community is an important practi-
cal interest, municipal zoning laws are carefully drafted to meet the “le-
gal necessity” standard of Dillon’s Rule. At the same time, judicial scru-
tiny over zoning ordinances is guided by another crucial variable: the 
interests of the incumbent landowner. 
                                                     
 48. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of 
Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 890–91 (1983); Eric H. Steele, Participation and Rules—
The Functions of Zoning, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 709, 713 (1986). 
 49. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 45, 46 & n.6 (1994) (discussing the universality of zoning laws). 
 50. Id. at 68 (emphasis omitted). 
 51. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 340–
41 (2002) (discussing the importance of “protecting the decisional process” for a regional plan and 
finding that a rule penalizing long deliberations would “disadvantage those landowners and interest 
groups who are not as organized or familiar with the planning process”). 
 52. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971). 
 53. Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., 48 F.3d 810, 821 n.3 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 54. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11. 
 55. Chem. Bank v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 666 P.2d 329, 339 (1983) (internal citations 
omitted); see also Hugh Spitzer, “Home Rule” vs. “Dillon’s Rule” for Washington Cities, 38 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 809, 813–16 (2015). 
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A. Zoning and the Interests of the Incumbent Landowner 
The enforcement of local zoning ordinances is an essential ingredi-
ent in securing community members’ reliance interests in their homes. 
Residents of all income groups become attached not only to their person-
al home or living space but also to the traits of their surrounding neigh-
borhood.56 Whether homeowners or renters, residents “selfishly” care 
about things such as the appearance of their street or the neighborhood 
park where their children play throughout the summer.57 Public zoning 
proceedings allow residents to express their desires for the preservation 
of the characteristics that they most strongly value and to develop a de-
gree of consensus around core community issues.58 Preventive land use 
regulation is important in determining the compatibility of land uses 
within a neighborhood—a significant component of community charac-
ter. At the parcel-by-parcel level, studies have found zoning laws to be 
positively correlated with property values because they prevent the dimi-
nution in value from mixed and incompatible land uses.59 
In fact, communal attitudes toward zoning expectations have even 
begun to impact judicial review of zoning ordinances. American courts 
have historically given significant weight to the interests of individual 
property owners in their determinations regarding land use.60 More re-
cently, though, concern for the general community welfare has begun 
taking precedence, thus favoring most exclusionary zoning measures.61 
Communities have been granted a degree of freedom to enact policies in 
accordance with community welfare goals even in many cases where 
such policies infringe upon a specific individual’s property rights.62 
Courts have also begun to shift their jurisprudence to reflect a belief that 
municipal regulatory power emanates from its role as an agent for local 
                                                     
 56. See Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 362 (1986) 
(discussing residents’ interest in remaining in an “established” home). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Ariel Graff, Comment, Calibrating the Balance of Free Exercise, Religious Establishment, 
and Land Use Regulation: Is RLUIPA an Unconstitutional Response to an Overstated Problem?, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 485, 519 (2005) (arguing that developing a comprehensive zoning plan “forces resi-
dents to mediate between conflicting values and arrive at a consensus that accurately captures local 
sentiments”). 
 59. See, e.g., Stephen Malpezzi et al., New Place-to-Place Housing Price Indexes for U.S. 
Metropolitan Areas, and Their Determinants, 26 REAL EST. ECON. 235, 263 (1998) (finding that 
regulations drove up “quality adjusted” rents and housing prices). 
 60. See Paul E. King, Exclusionary Zoning and Open Housing: A Brief Judicial History, 68 
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 459, 460 (1978). 
 61. JONATHAN LEVINE, ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND CHOICES IN 
TRANSPORTATION AND METROPOLITAN LAND-USE 97 (2005). 
 62. Id. 
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residents and families rather than for the government.63 Many of these 
rulings have focused on the rights and interests of residents in suburban 
areas where homeowners tend to comprise a significant component of the 
local power base.64 
Despite favorable court rulings for suburban residents, developers 
in more urban environments tend to exert disproportionate influence in 
the land use process because their interests are highly concentrated, elim-
inating the organizational problems that face neighbors who might op-
pose development.65 As such, urban residents’ reliance upon zoning pro-
tections may be positively correlated with local community members’ 
ability to more regularly and more actively participate in neighborhood 
land use determinations. 
B. Protection Against Externalities 
Zoning advocates have historically suggested that zoning is neces-
sary to protect or enhance property values,66 particularly the values of 
residential properties.67 In this way, zoning serves principally to protect 
property owners from the negative externalities of new developments. 
Without zoning, residential property owners would face plummeting 
property values if a development with significant negative externalities—
a tannery or a metal grinding shop, for example—moved in next door. 
Moreover, the mere prospect that such a development could move in 
would tend to depress the value of residential property. The solution that 
zoning provides is to divide the municipality into zones so that industries 
are sited near other industries, commercial enterprises near other com-
mercial enterprises, and residential properties with other residential 
properties. 
In a more salient example, Keith Wiley conducted a study in 2009 
examining the change in property values near residential infill sites in 
Montgomery County, Maryland.68 Wiley’s results across the various 
models identified a consistent, negative price effect associated with the 
infill.69 The study found that, in general, the property values of lower-
                                                     
 63. ROY LUBOVE, THE URBAN COMMUNITY: HOUSING AND PLANNING IN THE PROGRESSIVE 
ERA 95–98 (1967) (arguing for enactment of zoning ordinance principally as a means to protect 
existing property values). 
 64. See David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. 
REV. 1243, 1272–73 (1997). 
 65. Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 289 
(1992). 
 66. LUBOVE, supra note 63. 
 67. RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 115 (1966). 
 68. See KEITH WILEY, AN EXPLORATION OF THE IMPACT OF INFILL ON NEIGHBORHOOD 
PROPERTY VALUES (2009). 
 69. Id. at 23. 
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income areas tend to benefit whereas higher income areas had property 
values decline as a result of infill.70 Also, larger projects generated great-
er negative effects than smaller projects.71 
Some zoning advocates have suggested the prevention of “fiscal 
freeloading” as another benefit of zoning.72 According to this view, some 
new developments place a greater burden on public services than they 
contribute in new taxes.73 Zoning is a means by which such develop-
ments can be screened out in favor of developments that pay their fair 
share.74 Typically, it is lower-income, multifamily rental housing devel-
opments that are thought not to “pay their own way.”75 High-density, 
lower-cost developments often increase the demand for public services 
by the sheer increase in numbers of new residents they bring to the 
community.76 
C. Consumer Surplus 
Zoning provides additional benefits beyond simply protecting indi-
vidual property owners against the effects of “spillovers” or negative 
externalities that adversely affect the market values of their property.77 It 
also protects a homeowner’s consumer surplus in a home and in the sur-
rounding neighborhood—value that lies above the market value of that 
home. Zoning in urban neighborhoods is not merely a system for protect-
ing the market values of individual properties, but rather it is a device to 
protect neighborhood residents’ interests in their entirety, including con-
sumer surplus in their homes, as well as their interests in the neighbor-
hood commons.78 
Neighborhoods are not just made up of individual parcels, but in-
clude collective resources comprising a neighborhood commons,79 and 
the property rights of an urban neighborhood dweller typically consist 
                                                     
 70. Id. at 48. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See, e.g., Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Govern-
ments, 12 URB. STUD. 205, 206–07 (1975) (arguing that, in a metro area with a large number of 
competing municipal jurisdictions, the use of zoning as a neutral fiscal device can make residential 
property taxes function as an efficient price for public services). 
 73. Id. at 206. 
 74. See Michelle J. White, Fiscal Zoning in Fragmented Metro Areas, in FISCAL ZONING AND 
LAND USE CONTROLS 31–33 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975). 
 75. See Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 795, 
812–14 (1991). 
 76. Id. at 814. 
 77. ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN 
SYSTEM OF LAND USE REGULATION 7–10 (1977). 
 78. Id. at 10. 
 79. See Ralph Townsend & James A. Wilson, An Economic View of the Tragedy of the Com-
mons, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS 311 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987). 
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both in specified rights in an individual dwelling and inchoate rights in a 
neighborhood commons. This commons consists of open access, com-
munally owned property, such as streets, sidewalks, parks, playgrounds, 
and libraries.80 It also includes restricted access, communally owned 
property, such as public schools, public recreational facilities, and public 
transportation facilities.81 It further includes privately-owned “quasi-
commons” to which the public is generally granted access, but with pri-
vately imposed restrictions as to use, cost, and duration; examples in-
clude restaurants, nightspots, theaters, groceries, and retail establish-
ments.82 Finally, the neighborhood commons includes other intangible 
qualities, such as neighborhood ambiance, aesthetics, the physical envi-
ronment, and relative degrees of anonymity or neighborliness.83 These 
features together make up the “character” of a neighborhood. They are 
what give the neighborhood its distinctive flavor. An owner or renter of 
residential property in an urban neighborhood buys not only a particular 
parcel of real estate, but also a share in the neighborhood commons. Typ-
ically, differences in the neighborhood commons may be as crucial to a 
decision to purchase as differences in individual parcels.84 
For many people, a high level of consumer surplus may attach to 
particular features of a neighborhood commons. These values are highly 
subjective and may not be widely shared by people who have never lived 
in the neighborhood. Thus, they may add little or nothing to the market 
value of the property. Moreover, these resources are largely nonfungible 
and therefore irreplaceable. In addition to protecting the market value of 
their home and their consumer surplus in that particular piece of real es-
tate, residents will naturally want to protect those collective resources of 
their neighborhood that they care about most, whether they are reflected 
in the market value of their property or are part of their consumer sur-
plus.85 These values can be almost priceless, especially for long-term 
neighborhood residents. Like one’s home, one’s neighborhood may be 
centrally bound up in one’s definition of self and the sense of his or her 
place in the world. 
                                                     
 80. Id. at 312. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 313. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Mingche M. Li & H. James Brown, Micro-Neighborhood Externalities and Hedonic 
Housing Prices, 56 LAND ECON. 125, 126 (1980) (arguing that neighborhood “amenities” are signif-
icant factors in market value of residential real estate). 
 85. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 
YALE L.J. 385, 416 (1977). 
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IV. HARMS AND REMEDIES 
Some property owners and residents in Seattle, such as neighbors of 
the aPodments development in Capitol Hill mentioned earlier, have al-
leged damages to the neighborhood commons resulting from a signifi-
cant increase in local housing density and the lack of any planned reme-
dial efforts to enhance local resources, such as enhancing parking and 
transportation facilities. While new residents may not realize the reduc-
tion in available resources, long-time residents will likely feel the hit as 
will the commons. 
Whereas it may seem, at first glance, that the significant capital and 
profits generated from micro-housing developments are garnered only 
because of the particularly high price-per-square-foot rates charged in 
their leases,86 the consumer surplus present in the character of the neigh-
borhood and the community resources arguably allows for those high 
rental rates to be marketable. Such consumer surplus likely played a 
large role in the siting of these high-density developments, and such 
apartment complexes, on average, represent a significantly greater im-
pact to the commons than adjacent single family homes tend to have. 
Because the community commons has more significant utilization, the 
per-person (or per-property) related consumer-surplus value is dimin-
ished.87 While all of the residents in the neighborhood pay for the privi-
leges of the local consumer surplus, the only benefactors in this recent 
scenario have been the developers and landlords of such apartment com-
plexes.88 Though profit is an important element of incentivizing innova-
tion and development, profit at the expense of others in such a way is not 
an equitable or sustainable solution. 
A. Limitations of Remedies at Law 
By the time a building has been developed, or even by the earlier 
date of the construction permit issuance, it is too late for neighboring 
landowners to seek any remedy for such a reduction in their property 
values. Property owners who face loss of value in their property due to 
rezoning or neighbors’ conduct that falls below the nuisance threshold 
have few remedies available at law.89 Due to the regulatory apparatus of 
                                                     
 86. See Susan Kelleher, Seattle’s Micro-Housing Boom Offers an Affordable Alternative, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 7, 2015, 4:04 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/pacific-nw-magazine/ 
seattles-micro-housing-boom-offers-an-affordable-alternative/ (stating price per square foot as high 
as fifty dollars per month exist in some Seattle micro-housing units). 
 87. See Li & Brown, supra note 84. 
 88. Often, the same individual or partnership both builds and manages micro-housing units in 
Seattle. See, e.g., Holden, supra note 5. 
 89. A nuisance is anything that is “injurious to health or indecent or offensive to the senses, or 
an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to essentially interfere with the comfortable enjoy-
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Seattle building permitting, which allowed many nonconforming struc-
tures under the color of law, landowners’ claims of nuisance would fail 
the “under the express authority of a statute” element, as all of the build-
ing projects received a stamp of regulatory approval before any construc-
tion commenced. 
Moreover, the only context within nuisance jurisprudence in which 
courts have recognized diminution of value claims is hazardous waste 
contamination.90 Claims for diminution generally require a plaintiff to 
show actual physical contamination—though some courts have found 
mere stigma to be sufficient.91 Furthermore, claims are restricted when 
contamination falls below regulatory levels, further demonstrating 
courts’ accommodation to a potential tortfeasor’s reliance upon pub-
lished regulations. At their core, claims of diminution are ones of percep-
tion: the attraction of the plaintiff and market to the land. The plaintiff, 
the market, and the finder of fact must see the property as damaged in 
some way and undesirable for such claims to be brought and have any 
chance of success. This is a less likely occurrence in a rising real estate 
market. The market desperate for real estate is less likely to care about 
hypothetical stigma, and a jury, likely to include many who have been 
priced out of the windfall in real estate, may feel more jealous than sym-
pathetic towards a plaintiff claiming decreased appreciation. 
For the case at hand, no traditional common law remedies will pro-
vide relief to landowners who believe that their property values have 
been diminished by neighboring structures that negatively impact the 
character of their neighborhood. There generally is no physical contami-
nation in the landowner’s property from the construction of a higher-
density housing facility on an adjacent property. As such, under the cur-
rent diminution of value jurisprudence, incumbent landowners are pre-
cluded from recovering any market value decrease in their property due 
to nearby micro-housing development. 
                                                                                                                       
ment of the life and property.” WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.010 (2015). To prove a private cause of 
action of nuisance, a plaintiff must show interference that has “injuriously affected” his use and 
enjoyment of his property. Id. § 7.48.020. The causal conduct must be culpable and must not have 
been done “under the express authority of a statute.” Id. § 7.48.160; see, e.g., Kitsap Cnty. v. Kitsap 
Rifle & Revolver Club, 337 P.3d 328 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 352 P.3d 187 (Wash. 
2015). 
 90. See, e.g., Berger v. Smith, 95 S.E. 1098 (N.C. 1912) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that if his 
neighbor built a saw mill, it would cause injury to his property and depreciate its value). The court 
held that injunctive relief was inappropriate as there was only speculative proof of any possible 
injury. Id. at 1101. The court noted that if plaintiff’s conjectures were realized, he had a legal reme-
dy. Id. 
 91. While some jurisdictions and occasional outlier trial courts allow owners of uncontaminat-
ed property to recover for the perceived “stigma” of being near contamination, they are the excep-
tion. 
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B. Looking Toward a Plan for the Future 
While restrictive guidelines on rental unit number reporting and re-
cent city ordinances defining minimum standards for micro-housing de-
velopments are now in effect,92 given Seattle’s initial endorsement of 
underregulated micro-housing permitting in the late 2000s, the dilemma 
of dealing with yet-uncontemplated, novel development trends should be 
an ongoing concern for any current Seattle resident or homeowner. Be-
cause residents generally cannot avail themselves to a remedy after the 
construction of buildings that have slipped through zoning loopholes, and 
there is a general preclusion of ex post facto legislation which would 
change the statutory authority for such projects after they are underway, 
the only potential solution under the current Washington regulations 
would be to intervene in the permitting and preconstruction process—
before substantial reliance interests are created by high-density housing 
developers. 
Currently, the only regularly utilized methodology for higher scru-
tiny review of building permit and land use applications in Seattle in-
volves the public comment process and the potential for further environ-
mental assessments.93 Early developers of micro-housing apartments 
evaded this process by exploiting loopholes in the local building code, 
claiming justification for their action due to the prohibitively high cost 
thresholds of engaging in community comment periods and developing 
more comprehensive environmental impact plans.94 
One author has suggested a community board solution, borrowed 
from New York City’s model, to serve as a liaison between the public 
and the planning and zoning boards to better avoid land use disputes that 
emerge in the context of potential negative community impacts.95 The 
groups would be similar to New York City’s community boards, which 
provide an official body through which residents can propose zoning 
changes and can respond to others’ proposals.96 Unlike New York City’s 
community boards, however, the input groups would be required to con-
duct public hearings for each proposed land use permitting that could 
                                                     
 92. Daniel Beekman, Seattle City Council Approves Restrictions on Micro-Apartments, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 7, 2014, 11:07 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-city-
council-approves-restrictions-on-micro-apartments/. 
 93. Seattle Dep’t of Constr. & Inspections, Comment on a Project, SEATTLE.GOV, 
http://www.seattle.gov/dpd/permits/commentonaproject/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
 94. Holden, supra note 5. Some unhappy neighbors of properties that changed from single 
family homes to complexes housing upwards of fifty to sixty additional people in separate dwellings 
have claimed that they have experienced an injustice due to the lack of notice or ability to participate 
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 95. Juliana Maantay, Zoning Law, Health, and Environmental Justice: What’s the Connec-
tion?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 572, 583 (2002). 
 96. Id. 
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substantially affect property or living conditions within the neighbor-
hood.97 While this proposal gains positive benefits of ensuring communi-
ty participation in land use decisions, it does so at the cost of requiring 
potentially unnecessary and costly public hearings every time a devel-
opment with potential community effects is proposed. 
C. A Third Option 
A more efficient solution, which could better approximate both res-
idents’ and developers’ needs, would be to utilize nonjudicial community 
dispute resolution procedures during the building permitting process. 
Chapter 7.75 of the Revised Code of Washington authorizes cities 
and counties to create dispute resolution centers.98 Several jurisdictions 
have established centers to resolve conflicts, including nuisance prob-
lems.99 While the majority of cases involve public nuisance issues such 
as noise, animal complaints, and property maintenance concerns, there is 
nothing that prohibits such boards from mediating other neighbor con-
flicts as well. 
In order to significantly change the housing density of a piece of 
property, the City should require developers to provide public notice of 
their land use and development intentions within a reasonable timeframe 
before the anticipated commencement of construction. Within this 
timeframe, community members could have the option to schedule a 
meeting with the developer at a dispute resolution center. These commu-
nity dispute resolution centers could be utilized to clarify any plans and 
calm any concerns of neighbors to better ensure a harmonious coexist-
ence going forward. Moreover, if projects represented a significant 
change to the character of the local community, with a related net de-
crease in adjacent property values, incumbent homeowners and develop-
ers could negotiate a fee to remediate this harm and proceed with con-
                                                     
 97. Id. 
 98. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 7.75 (2014). 
 99. For example, Bellevue’s Neighborhood Mediation Program began as a pilot project in the 
code compliance division as an alternative to traditional enforcement of neighborhood issues. 
Neighborhood Conflict, CITY OF BELLEVUE, http://www.ci.bellevue.wa.us/neighborhood_ 
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struction, much as a party might buy an injunction from another to con-
tinue in some conduct considered to be a nuisance. 
Further, community and developer conversations could also lead to 
alternative solutions to better ensure maintenance of the character of the 
community and mitigate any harms to the local commons, which might 
come at a lesser aggregate cost if both interests are in agreement as to its 
solution. If no mutually beneficial agreement can be reached between the 
parties, the potential for a public comment and review cycle would 
emerge. Officials at the SDCI could then determine whether or not such 
review was necessary after hearing the concerns of both parties and con-
ducting their own closer analysis of the proposed construction. 
This system would create incentives for both incumbent homeown-
ers and developers to participate in good faith. For those projects that 
straddle the line between the letter of the zoning ordinance and improper 
land use, developers would have the incentive to invest up to the amount 
of the expense of a protracted public review (and possibly environmental 
review) of their project directly into the surrounding community either 
by paying individual landowners a fee to offset the diminution of their 
property values, or investing in the community to directly respond to 
harms to the commons, such as by providing more parking spaces or 
paying into a community trust account to fund future needs. Incumbent 
homeowners would be incentivized to participate by the possibility of 
recapturing property value that would potentially be lost, if a developer 
was forced to participate in a costly review but was still permitted to 
build essentially the same type of property as was first intended. 
Instead, rather than automatically requiring developers to partici-
pate in costly mandatory review processes, as has been advocated by 
some parties resisting the micro-housing trend,100 the above proposed 
solution aims to result in a more efficient mitigation to the property value 
harms that increased density in residential neighborhoods might bring. 
The central tenet of this solution is not that novel development projects 
such as micro-housing construction are bad or that they should be dis-
suaded from development. Rather, the primary problem with this recent 
trend in Seattle land development has been the value-grabbing behavior 
of the developers of such projects. It is this value-grabbing that the solu-
tion attempts to solve. 
                                                     
 100. Many of the parties resisting micro-housing development in Seattle have been local land 
use and neighborhood activists such as the Capitol Hill neighborhood’s Dennis Saxman and Chris 
Leman, who have opposed regulations that do not require mandatory review of micro-housing de-
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Through the sort of cooperation incentivized by alternative dispute 
resolution in this context, it is likely that sustainable profits can still be 
maintained. At the same time, the consumer surplus of the neighborhood 
character and commons may be sustained through developer concessions 
such as the provision of parking, aesthetic design agreements, or at min-
imum providing some level of economic relief for those whose property 
values have been decreased by adjacent high-density development. 
CONCLUSION 
While the above proposed solution would likely not endear itself to 
either side of the land development debate, it will provide a comfortable 
middle ground for both parties to avoid or mitigate the direct harms of 
significant density shifts in established urban residential neighborhoods. 
The general tenets of zoning as well as the Washington statutes and regu-
lations that control how municipalities regulate their own development 
point to community participation as an essential ingredient to the suc-
cessful facilitation of economic efficiencies and the building of shared 
value. Rather than continue to try to regulate from a top-down approach, 
the City of Seattle should thoroughly consider the interests of both sides 
of the debate on urban housing density increases. In so doing, Seattle 
could explore the possibility of better solutions emerging from the com-
munity and neighborhood level, with involved community participation 
as the GMA imagines, through a solution such as community dispute 
resolution. 
